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A PROPOSED ANALYSIS FOR GENDER-
BASED PRACTICES AND STATE PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS 
Bars, restaurants, and other establishments frequented by the public 
often extend preferential treatment to members of one sex in order 
to attract a larger or more select clientele. Women, for example, may 
be excluded from admissiori. 1 or required to have a male escort; 2 men 
may also be excluded3 or required to pay a greater admission fee than 
women. 4 This differential treatment is both inequitable and reinforces 
sexual stereotypes5 humiliating to many individuals. 6 
I. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970) (public bar prohibiting admission of females). See generally Seidenberg, The Federal Bar 
v. The Ale House Bar: Women and Public Accommodations, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 318 (1971) 
(discussing exclusionary practices). 
2. See, e.g., De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (refusal 
to serve unescorted woman not prohibited by federal law); De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 
59 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1969) (refusal to serve unescorted woman not prohibited 
by state law). 
3. See, e.g., Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 (N.Y. Div. Human 
Rts. Apr. 14, 1980) ("women only" health spa). 
4. See McDaniel v. Cory, 631 P.2d 82 (Alaska 1981) (differential prices on the basis of race 
and sex); Tucich v. Dearborn Indoor Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 309 N.W.2d 615 (1981) 
(differential membership charge for men and women); Abosh v. New York Yankees, Inc., No. 
CPS-25284-71 (N.Y. Human Rts. App. Bd. July 19, 1972) (reduced admission prices for women 
at Yankee baseball games); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 
635 P.2d 683 (1981) (reduced admission prices for women at Seattle Supersonics basketball games). 
5. See, e.g., Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) ("To adhere to practices supported by ancient chivalristic concepts, when there may no 
longer exist a need or basis therefor, may only serve to isolate women from the realities of every-
day life, and to perpetuate, as a matter of law, economic and sexual exploitation."); B. BAB-
COCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & L. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION 1037 (1975) ("Exclusion and 
segregation are variously defended as necessary to discourage prostitution, to protect women 
themselves, or, just as often, to protect the all-male atmosphere."). See generally Freeman, The 
Legal Basis of the Sexual Caste System, 5 VAL. U.L. REV. 203 (1971) (depicting our system as 
one of "institutionalized inequality"); Harzenski & Weckesser, The Case for Strictly Scrutiniz-
ing Gender-Based Separate But Equal Classification Schemes, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 439, 472-478 (1979) 
(separate but equal classification schemes may perpetuate outdated and improper stereotypes 
about men and women); Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Ap-
proach To The Topics, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 581 (1977) (socially created sexual distinctions are 
often cited to justify sexual differentiation). 
6. See, e.g., Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (holding the demeaning nature of a particular wardrobe to be unequally burdensome 
and illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 
& Supp. IV 1980)); Interview, Blow Whistle on NBA Champs' Ladies' Nights, 65 A.B.A. J. 
1619 (1979) (alleging that ladies' nights derive partly from a view of women as sex objects); 
Transcript of Hearings on Exemptions to Sex Discrimination in the Public Accommodations 
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Effective relief from such gender-preferential practices has not come 
from either the federal Constitution' or federal legislation. 8 Some states 
have attempted to compensate for this deficiency by implementing public 
accommodations statutes.9 These statutes typically guarantee both sexes 
the right of "full and equal enjoyment" of all the "advantages, facilities 
and privileges" of a "place of public accommodation." 10 The precise 
Law, New York City Comm'n. on Human Rights 200-01 (Jan. 14, 1971), reprinted in B. BAB-
COCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & L. Ross, supra note 5, at 1069 (testimony that ladies' nights 
at ball parks perpetuate an image of women as "unatheletic, improvident, ... and silly"); Harkins, 
Sex and the City Council, N. Y. MAG., April 27, 1970, at 10-ll (reciting some instances of 
discrimination in public accommodations and the patrons' reaction to them). Cf H.R. REP. 
No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355 (preven-
ting humiliation is one purpose behind the prohibition of racial discrimination in public accom-
modations under§ 2000a of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the demeaning nature of a par-
ticular wardrobe is unequally burdensome on women and thus illegal under Title Vil of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). 
7. Whether the fourteenth amendment has any role to play in the resolution of this issue 
is currently uncertain. Actions brought pursuant to the fourteenth amendment require a showing 
of "state action." See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 545 (1875) ("The four-
teenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen against another."). While 
this requirement was met in two cases involving preferential treatment for men, see Seidenberg 
v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (granting of liquor license 
to all-male bar held to constitute state action); Johnson v. Heinemann Candy Co., Inc., 402 
F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (agreement between owner of restaurant with only limited seating 
for women, and city attorney and police department for enforcement of preferential policy, held 
sufficient governmental involve·ment to constitute state action), recent Supreme Court decisions 
indicate reluctance to find state action in private discrimination. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (granting liquor license to private club is not sufficient state action). 
Moreover, where the practice is not explicitly gender-preferential, a showing of disparate im-
pact may not suffice because the fourteenth amendment requires proof of a "specific discriminatory 
intent." See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (adverse effects of gender-
neutral practice must reflect invidious intent to violate the fourteenth amendment); Washington 
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1975) (disparate impact on blacks of a local government's employment 
test does not deny equal protection). 
8. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not prohibit sex discrimination in public 
accommodations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976) ("All persons shall be entitled to the full and 
equal enjoyment . . . of any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or 
segre~ation on the ground of race, creed, color, religion, or national origin."); De Crow v. Hotel 
Syracuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding Title II inapplicable to a case in-
volving sex discrimination). 
9. In contrast to the fourteenth amendment, these public accommodation Jaws usually re-
quire neither state action nor invidious intent. A showing of state action is unnecessary because 
the state may control this aspect of its citizens' behavior through its police power. See, e.g., 
Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 IowA L. REV. 1067, 1086-95 (1964). 
Moreover, depending upon the precise wording of the statutes, proof of a specific discriminatory 
intent may not be necessary to establish a violation of a state's antidiscrimination Jaws. See 
infra notes 31-39 & 66-67 and accompanying text. 
10. Defining places of public accommodation is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally 
Avins, What ls A Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REV. l (1968) (discussing 
federal Jaw); Note, Public Accommodations Laws And The Private Club, 54 GEO. L.J. 915 (1966) 
(discussing federal and state laws). 
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scope of such legislation, however, remains unclear. State courts have 
advocated widely differing tests, none of which adequately address the 
problems presented by gender-preferential practices. 
This Note argues that the proper test of gender-preferential prac-
tices in public accommodations proceeds from the principle of "equal 
treatment:'' separate standards are tolerable only where reasonable and 
applied evenhandedly. Part I sets out a typical public accommodations 
statute and criticizes the principle tests used to evaluate this type of 
legislation. Part II applies traditional methods of statutory construc-
tion which trigger an equal treatment analysis. Extrapolating from this 
analysis, Part III advocates a two-part test for examining gender-based 
practices in public accommodations. 
I. CURRENT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING GENDER-BASED 
PRACTICES IN PUBLIC ACCO MM ODA TIO NS 
Gender-based practices distinguish individuals by gender, establishing 
different standards for men and for women. 11 "Ladies' nights," 12 "men 
only" bars, 13 separate accommodations, 14 "women only" health spas, 15 
and numerous either practices16 exemplify overt gender-based distinc-
tions often made ·in public accommodations. In addition, "sex-plus" 
practices, 11 such as hair and dress codes, further reflect gender-based 
distinctions by regulating on the basis of some "neutral" characteristic. 18 
Such gender-based practices have prompted much state legislation. 
At least thirty-four jurisdictions have enacted human rights laws pro-
11. In other words, these practices employ sex as a classifying device. See Harzenski & 
. Weckesser, supra note 5, at 440 n.2. 
12. In this Note the term "ladies' nights" refers to the practice of allowing women to pay 
reduced prices either for admission or for the goods and services of a place of public accom-
modation. For cases testing these practices, see supra note 4. 
13. See generally Seidenberg, supra note I. 
14. The term "separate accommodations" means gender-segregation, a practice commonly 
employed with respect to rest rooms, hospital rooms, and prison facilities. 
15. See Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 (N.Y. Div. Human 
Rts. April 14, 1980). 
16. In addition to such easily categorized practices, a number of less prominent policies have 
been adjudicated; See, e.g., Boesen v. Macy's N. Y., Inc., No. P-S-50528-77 N.Y. Div. Human 
Rts. June 24, 1980) (different alteration fees for similar men's and women's clothing). Cf. Women 
Hemmed In By Alteration Fees, 68 A.B.A.J. 669 (alteration fees); N. Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1982, 
at Al7, col. 1 (Chatham, Massachusetts all-male town band). 
17. Cf. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1970) (employer's refusal to hire 
women with pre-school age children constitutes a sex-based distinction for purposes of Title VII). 
See generally Note, Employer Dress and Appearance Codes and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 46 s. CAL. L. REV. 965, 989-90 (1973). 
18. Sex-plus practices focus not upon an immutable characteristic but upon a characteristic 
shared by both sexes. In doing so, however, these practices establish different standards for men 
and women on the basis of that characteristic. 
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hibiting sex discrimination in public accommodations. 19 A typical public 
accommodations statute20 provides: 
(1) The right to be free from discrimination because of race, 
creed, color, national origin, sex, or the presence of any sen-
sory, mental, or physical handicap is recognized as and declared 
to be a civil right. This right shall include, but not be limited to: 
(a) ... 
(b) The right to the full enjoyment of any of the accom-
modations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of 
public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement. 21 
The proper scope of this type of statute, however, is unsettled. Judicial 
analysis has been widely divergent, irreconcilable, and generally 
misguided. 
Public accommodations statutes generally have been interpreted in 
one of three widely divergent ways. Some courts seemingly apply a 
"gender-blind" 22 test, rejecting any gender-based distinctions in public 
accommodations. 23 Other courts look to the motive behind a gender-
preferential practice and suggest that an absence of invidious discrim-
inatory intent may excuse an otherwise illegal distinction. 24 Still other~ 
19. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (1981); CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1982); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519 (1981); IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (Supp. 
1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 5-101 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 
(West 1981); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.7 (West 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1981); KY. 
REV. STAT. § 344.145 (1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4592 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 
498, § 5 (Supp. 1982); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1980); MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 314.010 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 49-2-304 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20.132 
(1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 354-A:8 (Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 10:5-4 (1976); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-1-7 (1978); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 
12.1-14-04 (1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02 (Page Supp. 1981); OR. REV. STAT.§ 30.670 
(1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (Purdon Supp. 1965-1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 20-13-23 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 4-21-III (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 13-7-3 (Supp. 
1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982); W. VA. CODE§ 5-11-9 (1979); WIS. 
STAT. ANN. § 942.04 (West Supp. 1982). 
20. The statutes vary slightly from state to state, especially in the remedies provided. Because 
some statutes provide for criminal as well as civil penalties, invidious intent may be a necessary 
element of those cases in which criminal penalties are sought. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 469-64(c) (West Supp. 1982). The precise language framing the right may differ, as may the 
particular accommodations covered. Nevertheless, the substantive provisions of these statutes, 
are in most cases sufficiently similar that the statutes should be interpreted identically. For an 
overview of these statutes see Note, Survey of Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. 
L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978). 
21. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added). 
22. Cf. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,238 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is designed to be "color-blind."). 
23. See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
FALL 1982] Public Accommodations Laws 139 
utilize an "encouragement discouragement" distinction, upholding prac-
tices designed merely to encourage attendance. 25 Although each of these 
analyses is plausible, none support the true purpose of public accommo-
dations laws: equal treatment. 
A. Sweeping Interpretations and Gender-blindness 
Some court opinions imply that state antidiscrirnination laws were in-
tended to prohibit all gender-based distinctions in public accomoda-
tions. In Braun v. Swiston 26 a New York trial court held that excluding 
a long-haired male from defendant's restaurant violated the state an-
tidiscrimination statute because defendant had no similar policy ex-
cluding long-haired females. 2 ' In MacLean v. First Northwest Industries 
of America, Inc. 28 the Washington State Appellate Court struck down 
price reductions offered only to women ("ladies' nights"), reasoning 
that this practice would clearly be illegal had it been offered on the 
basis of race. 29 
Whether or not these outcomes are correct, the courts' opinions ar-
ticulate an unnecessarily broad test. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
this "gender-blindness" test leads to absurd, unisex requirements. Cer-
tain situations warrant separate treatment for men and women; when 
applied evenhandedly such separate treatment need not burden one sex 
25. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
26. 72 Misc. 2d 661, 340 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1972). 
27. Id. at 662, 340 N.Y.S.2d at 469. 
28. 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 1027 (1979), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981). 
29. Id. at 171-74, 600 P.2d at 1032-34. The court noted that: 
The injustice of the case at bar would readily be recognized as impermissible if it arose 
in the context of race. It would be inconceivable to have a "Blacks' Night" or a "Whites' 
Night" or a "Filipinos' Night" at the Seattle Center Coliseum. It would be unsupportable 
for the City of Seattle to increase its coffers or take in any revenues on the basis of 
race classifications. 
Id. at 171, 600 P.2d at 1032. 
The court's analogy to race is nevertheless imperfect. The Supreme Court has historically treated 
racial discrimination and sex discrimination differently under the fourteenth amendment. As a 
result, gender-based discrimination triggers close scrutiny though not the "strict scrutiny" ap-
plied to racial classifications. Compare McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (racial 
distinctions must serve some "overriding statutory purpose"), and Korematsu v·. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("(A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect ... [and) courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."), 
with Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("Classifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and be substantially related to achievement of those objectives."), and 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (application of the Craig test to "benign" gender-discriminatory 
practices). 
Moreover, gender-based distinctions, unlike racial distinctions, legitimately may exist because 
of biological differences between males and females. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) 
(bona fide occupational qualification exception to Title Vil). Cf. Rosther v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 
57 (1981) (upholding registration of men but not women for the draft). 
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more than the other. 30 Separate hospital rooms and rest rooms are two 
such examples. The overly broad test implicit in Braun and MacLean, 
therefore, does not accommodate gender-based distinctions which may 
be non-discriminatory and socially desirable. Existing restrictive inter-
pretations, however, are equally unacceptable. 
B. Restrictive Interpretations 
In contrast to the gender-blindness approach, which does not look 
behind a gender-based practice, some courts focus on the "means and 
motivations" behind gender-based practices. 
1. Invidious intent- In reversing the appellate court's decision in 
MacLean, 31 the Washington State Supreme Court noted in dictum that 
an absence of discriminatory intent might excuse a gender-preferential 
practice. 32 The court then noted that in the case of "ladies' nights," 
an inference of discriminatory intent could be rebutted by a showing 
that defendant had also maintained policies benefiting men, such as 
price reductions for military personnel. 33 
Proof of "invidious intent," however, has never been required under 
state public accommodations laws34 or analogous federal law. 35 Such 
30. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
31. 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981). 
32. Id. at 341, 635 P .2d at 684. 
33. Id. 
34. Other courts, including the Braun court and the lower court in MacLean have ignored 
the issue of defendant's intent. One court has explicitly rejected this argument in the context 
of discrimination on the basis of handicap. See Vidrich v. Vic Tanny Int'!, Inc., 102 Mich. App. 
230, 301 N.W.2d 482 (1980) (exclusion of a blind patron on the basis of safety concerns and 
lack of discriminatory intent prohibited). CJ. New York Inst. of Technology v. State Div. of 
Human Rts., 48 A.D.2d 132, 368 N.Y.S. 2d 201, 207 (1975) (construing the employment discrimina-
tion provisions of the New York Human Rights Law to prohibit a hiring system which was 
not discriminatory in form or intent but had such an effect), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.Y.2d 
316, 386 N. Y.S.2d 685 (1976). 
35. The federal counterpart to state public accommodations laws is Title II of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976), which bars discrimination in places of public,accom-
modation on the basis of race, color, religion or national origin. Lack of invidious intent does 
not excuse discrimination otherwise barred by this statute. For instance, in Katzenbach v. Gulf 
State Theaters, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 549 (N.D. Miss. 1966), the defendants attempted to justify 
the exclusion of blacks from a movie theater by arguing that blacks were admitted in other theaters 
owned by the defendants, and that economic reasons alone motivated the challenged conduct. 
They claimed that their discriminatory actions did not manifest a discriminatory intent and therefore 
fell outside the statutory proscriptions. Rejecting this argument, the district court noted that 
Title II forbids all racial discrimination "regardless of the presence or absence of racial prejudice 
in the minds of the defendants." Id. at 552. 
In addition, no other federal anti-discrimination legislation requires a showing of invidious 
discriminatory intent. Proof that an employment practice unrelated to job performance has a 
disparate impact on members of a protected group will support a discrimination claim under 
Title VII of the 1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See generally 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. Dist. 
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a requirement would undermine these statutes. Moreover, endorsing 
"offsetting" discriminatory practices merely exacerbates an already 
discriminatory policy. Gender-based distinctions, even if "the product 
of innocent, protective, or well-intentioned motivations," 36 may rein-
force stereotypes 37 that later encourage even more serious sex 
discrimination. 38 Balancing - or more accurately, offsetting 
discriminatory practices - must therefore be rejected as incompatible 
with a societal goal of equal rights for all persons regardless of gender. 39 
2. Encouragement/discouragement- Some courts hold that prac-
tices which "encourage" admission of a single sex do not contravene 
public accommodations statutes. In Tucich v. Dearborn Racquet C/ub40 
the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state's public accommoda-
tions law does not bar preferential admission prices for one sex. The 
court ruled that this practice merely encourages attendance and does 
not deny the non-favored class "the advantages, facilities, and 
privileges" of the public accommodation. 41 
#II, 641 F.2d 835, 839 (10th Cir. 1981). The courts are currently split on whether a Title VI 
claim requires only proof of a discriminatory impact. See generally Note, Intent or Impact: Pro-
ving Discrimination Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1095 
(1982). 
36. Harzenski &. Weckesser, supra note 5, at 468. 
37. See generally id. at 472 (claiming that strict scrutiny should apply to gender-based separate-
but-equal statutory schemes because, though discriminatory motives may be non-existent or hard 
to prove, history demonstrates the misuse of such classification schemes). 
38. See id. at 472-78 (noting a continued reliance upon "habit-forming stereotypical assump-
tions"); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIJTIONAL LAW § 16-25, at 1063-66 (noting that stereotypes 
"chill sex-role experimentation"). See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975) (referring 
to self-fulfilling nature of sterotypes); Freeman, supra note 5 (describing how the legal system 
engenders and perpetuates sex-based myths). Cf. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 594 (noting our 
"patriarchal system of power relationships"). 
39. Even within the parameters of its own balancing test, the Washington State Supreme 
Court's characterization in MacLean of offsetting practices is highly questionable. Men and women 
alike benefit from a senior citizens' night or a military members' night, whereas only women 
were eligible for the reduced admission price offered on "Ladies' Night." 
40. 107 Mich. App. 398, 309 N.W.2d 615 (1981) (involving male plaintiffs suit against several 
area tennis clubs which offered preferential admission prices to women). 
41. Id. at 405-406, 309 N.W.2d at 618. See also Magid v. Oak Park Racquet Club Assocs., 
Inc., 84 Mich. App. 522, 526-27, 269 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (1978) (preferential membership fees 
for women); MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 635 P.2d 
683, 685-86 (preferential admission policies do not make a member of the non-preferred class 
feel "not welcome, accepted, desired, or solicited."). But see McDaniel v. Cory, 631 P.2d 82 
(Alaska 1981) (rejecting differential pricing schemes for men and women); Abosh v. New York 
Yankees, Inc., No. CPS-25284-71 (N.Y. Human Rts. App. Bd., July 19, 1972) (holding that 
reduced admission prices for women at Yankee baseball games violated state public accommoda-
tions law); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 4592 (1979) (discrimination "against any person in 
the price, terms or conditions upon which access to such accommodation, advantages, facilities, 
and privileges may depend" is prohibited); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04(l)(a) (West Supp. 1982) 
(violation of state law to deny or charge another a "higher price than the regular rate"). 
For a definitional treatment of the statutes see infra notes 48°50 and accompanying text. The 
distinction between practices that encourage and those that discourage admission is critical to 
the Tucich Court's argument because practices discouraging admission clearly violate the statute 
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Like the invidious intent test, however, practices encouraging the 
attendance of one sex may perpetuate unreasonable stereotypes. 42 For 
instance, when the defendant in Tucich argued that the differential 
membership fee helped persuade women to attend during the day, 43 
this "justification" reflected a stereotype of women as "homemakers" 
who have considerable free time during the day. Furthermore, implicit 
in Tucich and similar opinions is the assumption that practices encourag-
ing the attendance of one sex do not violate the statutory language 
because they benefit all patrons44 or at least do not exclude members 
of the non-preferred group. 45 The validity of such an assumption is 
questionable. Preferential pricing policies may well impose a "sur-
charge"46 on the non-favored group. This surcharge may outweigh the 
economic benefits potential patrons derive from the preferential prac-
tice, thereby deterring their attendance. 47 Thus, the court's argument 
by denying potential patrons all the advantages and facilities of an establishment. Such a fine 
distinction, however, is overly strict and unwarranted, see infra notes 51-65 and accompanying 
text, in light of the liberal construction these statutes should be given. See, e.g., N. Y. EXEC. 
LAW§ 300 (McKinney 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-1 (Supp. 1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 49.60.020 (Supp. 1982). Moreover, preferential admission prices can serve an exclusionary function 
which denies members of the non-preferred class the facilities of an accommodation. See infra 
notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the encouragement/discouragement distinction in some 
Title VII cases on the grounds that policies encouraging employment of a protected class may 
atone for the vestiges of past intentional discrimination hindering present opportunities to qualify 
for employment. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1978). This logic, 
however, is inapposite to public accommodation cases: absent a discriminatory policy, nothing 
impedes the ability of one group to attend an accommodation. 
42. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
43. 107 Mich. App. at 401, 309 N.W.2d at 617. 
44. See id. at 405, 309 N.W.2d at 619 ("[T)he price differential is designed to encourage 
membership and make the club facilities more available to both sexes."); MacLean v. First North-
west Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 342, 635 P.2d 683, 685 (noting that "ladies' nights" 
benefit the team's fans by providing additional revenues with which the best players can be bought). 
45. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
46. A surcharge is a price above that normally demanded for a good or service. Few charges 
are explicitly denoted as surcharges, and a determination of whether a fee constitutes the "normal" 
price or a surcharge is quite difficult, especially where different rates are charged at different 
times. In addition, any discriminatory price could be viewed as a surcharge relative to the lower 
price charged an advantaged group. 
47. In some cases, this exclusion may even be intended. Although an intentionally exclu-
sionary price would violate even the narrow MacLean test, it may be difficult for the courts 
to determine that a particular price is a surcharge, see supra note 46, or that it is intended to 
be prohibitive. 
Moreover, to the extent that a preferential pricing policy leads to increased attendance by 
the preferred group, the policy may effectively exclude other patrons because of an accommoda-
tion's limited capacity. 
Finally, these practices may also result in distributive inefficiencies. Consider a ladies' night 
policy making $2.00 drinks available for $1.00 to female patrons. Patron F, a female, may value 
drink X at $1.25 and patron M, a male, may value that same drink at $1.75. At $2, patrons 
F and M will be unwilling to purchase drink X while at the preferential $1 price for women 
patron F may be induced to buy it. If drink X is consumed by patron F who values it substantially 
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fails: practices encouraging the attendance of one sex do no necessarily 
benefit all patrons and may even exclude them. 
In sum, the sweeping "gender-blindness" test and the restrictive 
invidious-intent and encouragement/discouragement tests fail to with-
stand close analysis; the former because some situations warrant dif-
ferential treatment, the latter because they may foster unreasonable 
stereotypes or promote exclusionary practices. On a more fundamen-
tal level, however, these tests are entirely misguided: none comports 
fully with the legislative intent underlying state public accommodations 
laws. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EQUAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLE 
The uncertain scope of public accommodations laws can be attributed 
to the attempt to achieve broad goals through vague language. Crucial 
terms such as "full enjoyment," "advantages," or "privileges" may 
be undefined48 or the statutory definitions unclear. For example, the 
state of Washington's anti-discrimination law defines "full enjoyment" 
to "include" the.right to be free from acts that "directly or inairectly" 
cause a potential patron to feel "not welcome, accepted, desired or 
solicited. " 49 Use of the term "includes" suggests that the statute is 
not exhaustive, lending itself to diverse interpretations. 5° Moreover, 
clarity is hardly furthered by terms as nebulous as "not welcome"; 
any preferential practice can make a member of the non-preferred class 
feel "not welcome" or unsolicited. The precise applicability of this 
less than patron M, then society does not derive its maximum utility from its available resources, 
in this case drink X. 
48. The terms "privileges" and "advantages" are not defined in any state's statute. "Full 
enjoyment" is directly or indirectly defined in only some of the statutes. See infra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
49. WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§ 49.60.040 (Supp. 1982). The Michigan statute, MICH. STAT. 
ANN. § 28-343, 344 (Callaghan 1981), indirectly defines it as a withholding, refusal, or denial 
of all the "advantages, facilities, and privileges" of an accommodation. See Tucich v. Dearborn 
Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 402, 309 N.W.2d 615, 618 (1981). 
50. The MacLean court refused to address the issue of what conduct, other than that ex-
pressly stated in the statute, the term "includes" might encompass. MacLean v. First Northwest 
Indus. of Am., Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 344, 635 P.2d 683, 686. The dissent, in contrast, sug-
gested that the statutory definition of full enjoyment was intended only to illustrate possible 
applications of the term "full enjoyment." Id. at 350, 635 P.2d at 689. (Utter, J., dissenting). 
Rather than confront this issue, the MacLean majority held that the plaintiff had not been "in-
jured" for purposes of the Washington statute, a puzzling ruling that hinged on the community 
property laws of Washington. The court reasoned that the plaintiff benefited from "ladies' night" 
because of the reduction his wife received and thus sustained no injury within the meaning of 
the statute. This logic is apparently inapplicable in those states without community property 
laws though the court stated that its reasoning would apply had the plaintiff taken only a female 
friend. Id. at 685, 635 P.2d at 690. Moreover, this holding is simply not persuasive. See id. 
at 351, 635 P.2d at 690 (Utter, J., dissenting) (discrimination can be per se injurious). 
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statute is therefore uncertain, and must be determined through tradi-
tional interpretive techniques. 
Courts confronted with an ambiguous statute must construe its terms 
in accordance with the legislature's intent. 51 A preferred source of 
legislative intent is the statute's legislative history. 52 Where this source 
is not conclusive - often the case with state public accommodations 
laws53 - courts must turn to traditional rules of statutory construction.54 
Applied to state public accommodations legislation, these traditional 
rules suggest the same thing: the legislation was intended to provide 
"equal treatment" for both men and women. 
For instance, the plain or "ordinary meaning" rule, 55 when applied 
to a typical antidiscrimination statute, 56 supports the equal treatment 
interpretation. "Advantage" is commonly defined as a "favorable posi-
tion" or "benefit"; 51 "privilege" is defined as "a right granted as a 
benefit" or an "exemption from a burden. " 58 Substituting these defini-
tions for the statutory language, the law guarantees both sexes the full 
enjoyment (or full and equal enjoyment) of all the benefits an accom-
51. See, e.g., United States v. Klinger, 199 F.2d 645, 648 (2d Cir. 1952) (L. Hand, J.) ("Flinch 
as we may, what we do, and must do, is to project ourselves, as best we can, into the position 
of those who uttered the words, and to impute to them how they would have dealt with the 
concrete occasion."), afj'd, 345 U.S. 979 (1953). 
52. See, e.g., Lehman, How to Interpret a Difficult Statute, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 489, 491. 
53. Legislative histories to state statutes are notoriously scarce. See C. NUTTING & R. DICKER-
SON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 560 (1978). A thorough search of the history under-
lying the Michigan public accommodations statute disclosed only procedural data. See 3 MICH. 
SENATE J., 2479 (1972) (P.L. 4139 and history thereoO. In addition, written requests for available 
historical information by the author of this Note to many state Human Rights Commissions 
proved equally unsuccessful. With one exception, the commissions contacted responded negatively 
or failed to respond. Materials submitted by the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights 
shed no light on the proper scope of the District of Columbia statute. This correspondence is 
on file with the Journal of Law Reform. 
54. See generally, P. MAXWELL, THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 39 (P. Langham 12th 
ed. 1969). 
55. See, e.g., Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893): 
There being no evidence that the words 'fruit' and 'vegetables' have acquired any 
special meaning in trade or commerce, they must receive their ordinary meaning. Of 
that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words 
in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, 
but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court. 
See generally E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 319 (1940). 
56. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1982) (set out supra text accom-
panying note 19). 
57. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 30 (1971). 
58. Id. at 1805. In Tucich v. Dearborn Racquet Club, 107 Mich. App. 398, 405, 309 N.W.2d 
615, 619 (1981), the Michigan Court of Appeals ignored the issue of whether plaintiff had been 
denied a privilege or advantage, focusing instead on whether he had been denied the use of 
the "facilities." Such an oversight is indefensible. The statute provides for the full enjoyment 
of all the privileges and advantages of a public accommodation, not merely access to the facilities 
of an accommodation. Besides, the price differential may act in an exclusionary manner, effec-
tively denying the plaintiff access to the accommodation. See supra notes 46-47 and accompany-
ing text. 
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modation extends to its patrons. Given the ordinary meaning of their 
terms, public accommodations statutes prohibit any gender preferen-
tial practice resulting in greater burdens or benefits; in short, they man-
date "equal treatment." 
The "mischief" rule 59 further supports this interpretation. Under the 
"mischief rule," statutes should be interpreted in that manner most 
conducive to suppressing the wrong the common law failed to address. 
The preambles to many public accommodations statutes60 indicate that 
the statutes were intended to prevent humiliation61 and to make all 
the goods, services, and facilities of an accommodation equally available 
to men and women. 62 The statutes thus promote equal treatment rather 
than gender-preferences. 63 
Confronted with race preferences, courts and commentators have 
consistently applied the principle of equal treatment when interpreting 
these statutes. 64 Gender-based practices have not, however, prompted 
an analogous response. 65 The "invidious intent test, " 66 for example, 
focuses upon the defendant's discriminatory motivation, not the con-
sequences of the preferential act. The encouragement/ discouragement 
test similarly ignores differential effects. 67 To the extent that these restric-
tive tests permit courts to ignore disparate treatment, they are incon-
sistent with the fundamental principle of equal treatment underlying 
public accommodations statutes. 
In contrast to these restrictive tests, the "gender-blindness" test pro-
hibiting all gender-based distinctions68 is overinclusive. The principle 
59. This rule apparently originated in Heydon's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 7a (1584), cited in P. MAX-
WELL, supra note 54, at 4043. 
60. Preambles may be used as an interpretive aid. See generally P. MAXWELL, supra note 
54, at 6-9. 
61. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. § 344.020 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-101 (Supp. 1982). 
62. See, e.g., IND. CoDE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (West 1981) ("equal access to and use of" a public 
accommodation). Indeed, many statutes use the term "full and equal enjoyment" rather than 
"full enjoyment." See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT. § 24-34-501 (Supp. 1981). 
63. The language of several statutes specifically forbids preferential treatment. See Wis. STAT. 
ANN. § 942.04 (West Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-23 (1979) (prohibiting 
unequal treatment in terms or conditions of accommodation). 
64. See, e.g., Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1978) (places 
of public accommodation have an obligation to treat each member of the public equally in the 
absence of good cause); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash. 24, 28, 194 P. 813 (1921) 
(public accommodations laws confer "upon all persons . . . the right to be admitted to the 
• places enumerated on equal terms ... "); Caldwell, State Public Accommodations Laws, Fun-
damental Liberties and Enforcement Programs, 40 WASH. L. REV. 841, 842 (1965) ("The legal 
objective of public accommodations statutes is to make equal access to and the use of places 
of public accommodations . . . a public right."). 
65. But see MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. of Am., Inc., 24 Wash. App. 161, 600 P.2d 
1027 (1979) (involving gender-preferential practice) (citing Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 
114 Wash. 24, 194 P. 813 (1921)), rev'd, 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981). 
66. See supra notes 31-39 and accompanying text. 
67. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text. 
68. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
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of equal treatment implicit in public accommodations statutes prohibits 
only preferential practices: practices conferring greater "advantages" 
or "privileges" on members of one sex. 69 Not every gender-based distinc-
tion violates this standard. Separate-but-equal standards'0 originating 
in cultural or biological differences, if they do not perpetuate 
unreasonable stereotypes' 1 and both males and females are held to 
"relatively similar standards," 72 need not burden one sex more than 
the other. 73 
The California Court of Appeals recognized this principle in Hales 
v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club, 74 a case involving different dress 
requirements for men and women. The Hales court remanded the 
dispute to determine whether the particular dress code was preferential. 75 
The remand order implied that a different dress requirement for males 
and females need not burden one sex more than the other. Hales thus 
recognizes that unisex standards need not be established to satisfy the 
"equal treatment" principle. 
Ill. A PROPOSED MODEL FOR CONSTRUING PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS STATUTES 
The key issue in assessing the legitimacy of a gender-based practice 
69. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text. 
70. In Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Supreme Court held that racially 
based separate-but-equal educational systems violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (striking down state miscegenation 
statute). 
Separate-but-equal gender-based situations do not enjoy the same degree of constitutional pro-
tection. See, e.g., Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976) (maintenance of 
some single sex schools in a system otherwise coeducational held constitutional), aff'd per curiam 
by an equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977). See generally Comment, Plessy Revived: The 
Separate But Equal Doctrine and Sex-Segregated Education, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 585 
(1977). 
71. See infra notes 80-90 and accompanying text. 
72. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th 
Cir. I 979) (striking down a dress code under Title VII because women were held to a stricter 
standard than men). 
73. See, e.g., Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 456 ("We admit that neither group 
in a separate but equal situation appears to be especially benefited or burdened; nor does either 
group appear to be especially disadvantaged."). 
Title VII grooming cases provide an instructive analogy. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. 
Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) ("It does not appear that defendant fails 
to impose grooming standards for female employees, thus in this respect each sex is treated 
equally."); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d lll5, 1117 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[flak-
ing account of basic differences in male and female physiques and common differences in customary 
dress of male and female employees, it is not usually thought that [a dress code] is unlawful 
discrimination because of sex."). 
74. 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1977) (women dressed in leisure suits admitted 
to an accommodation while a similarly attired male was not). 
75. Id. at 28, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 558. 
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is whether the separate standards burden or benefit the sexes unequally. 76 
Any gender-based distinction should raise a presumption of inequality, 77 
but not every such distinction violates the concept of equal treatment. 78 
This Note advocates a two-part test to determine the validity of separate 
standards embodied in gender-based distinctions. Separate standards 
apply equally and should be upheld when (1) they can be justified by 
commonly accepted social norms and do not promote unreasonable 
stereotypes, and (2) they apply evenhandedly to both men and women. 
A. Commonly Accepted Social Norms and Unreasonable Stereotypes 
Separate gender-based standards can be equal when they are sup-
ported by "commonly accepted" cultural differences. 79 Nevertheless, 
the prevalence of a particular gender-based practice is not dispositive 
of the equal treatment issue. Even widely accepted cultural distinctions 
can perpetuate the burdensome, humiliating, or demeaning stereotypes80 
public accommodations statutes were designed to eliminate. 81 The "com-
monly accepted social norm" defense might be invoked to justify every 
gender-based practice, 82 protecting even invidious discrimination merely 
76. When determining whether a practice burdens or benefits the sexes unequally, the focus 
should always be upon the separateness of standards rather than the practice itself. A practice 
may incorporate standards for both sexes; these separate standards, however, may be unequal 
or preferential. See, e.g., supra note 72 and accompanying text (dress codes). See also infra 
notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing evenhandness). 
77. Because few gender-based practices are likely to satisfy this Note's proposed equal-treatment 
test, every gender-based distinction should raise a rebuttable presumption of unequal burdens. 
The burden would then be upon the party implementing the practice to show that the practice 
is nonpreferential. 
78. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979) (as long as they can be justified in "com-
monly accepted social norms," separate standards of dress for men and women do not necessarily 
violate Title VII); Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 592-94 (noting that gender-segregation is often 
tolerated where it is "mutually undesirable" for men and women to associate, such as in rest rooms). 
A determination of whether a practice is "widely accepted," however, would likely require 
evidence both of similar practices elsewhere and of the degree of patron approval, evidence both 
difficult to acquire and to evaluate. 
80. Certain culturally imposed role expectations become so ingrained in a social system that 
members may sometimes fail to recognize the false stereotypes underlying these expectations. 
Consequently, a stereotyped member of society may accept mechanically this stereotype and assume 
the corresponding personality traits. This can result in both perpetuation of the stereotype and 
psychological defects in the actor. See generally Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 472-78; 
Note, "A Little Dearer than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the Feminine Personality, 6 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 260, 271-83 (1971). 
81. See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
82. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961), illustrates the point: 
[W)oman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that 
it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, 
to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless 
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because it is rooted in tradition. Consequently, even widely accepted 
gender-based practices in public accommodations should be closely 
scrutinized to determine whether they tend to promote unreasonable 
stereotypes. 
The reasonableness of a particular gender-based distinction depends 
upon two factors. The first is the cultural foundation for the distinc-
tion. Distinctions deriving in whole or in part from a humiliating or 
demeaning stereotype are inherently suspect. 83 For instance, the prac-
tice of excluding unescorted women from bars has sometimes stemmed 
from the belief that these women may be of low moral character. 84 
Some distinctions, however, serve merely to differentiate males from 
females without perpetuating unreasonable stereotypes·. Dress codes, 
for example, reflect social distinctions between the sexes rather than 
underlying, unfounded, and humiliating stereotypes. 85 
The second element of this reasonableness test requires that the distinc-
tion serve some important social policy. 86 If a gender-based practice 
implicates a demeaning stereotype, courts should balance the off en-
she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilties. 
See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) ("The 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for 
many of the occupations of civil life."). 
83. Some scholars argue that all gender-based distinctions, except those that are biologically 
necessary, are unreasonable because men would be virtually indistinguishable from women in 
the absence of culturally imposed differences. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 603-15; 
Harzenski & Weckesser, supra note 5, at 473, 477; Comment, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy 
Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 15 C0LUM. L. REV. 441, 461 (1975). 
Professor Wasserstrom labels this the "assimilationist" view. Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 604. 
Even if no legitimate non-cultural reasons justify some gender-based distinctions, however, these 
distinctions are not necessarily founded upon demeaning stereotypes. Some practices, like dress 
codes, serve merely to distinguish men from women without promoting the humiliating stereotypes 
that accompany practices like "men-only" bars. But see id. at 594 (all gender-based distinctions, 
including separate rest rooms, promote our oppressive "patriarchal system of power relationship"). 
84. See, e.g., De Crow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 383, 298 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1969). 
85. See, e.g., M. ROACH, The Social Symbolism of Women's Dress, in THE FABRICS OF 
CULTURE 415, 416 (1979) ("Once distinctions between the dress of sexes have existed for a long 
time, as is true in Western society, their continuation is supported by custom even though the 
tasks that men and women perform may change."). But see id. at 416 ("[T]hrough time a com-
plex set of meanings becomes attached to the traditional dress of each sex, and sanctions develop 
that discourage behavior inconsistent with meanings."). 
86. A number of state public accommodations statutes contain a public policy exception. 
See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (Michie/Law 
Coop. 1980); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.343 (Callaghan 1981). Such a provision would likely exempt 
many of the practices permitted under this Note's proposed test. A statutory public policy excep-
tion is narrower, however, than a reasonableness standard. Dress codes, for example, while 
reasonable, would not trigger a statutory public policy exception because such codes serve no 
important social function. Conversely, a statutory public policy exception is broader than the 
proposed reasonableness test; it could be invoked to exempt establishments incapable of comply-
ing with the state antidiscrimination law. See Romanov. Bohemia Health Operating, Inc., N.Y. 
State Div. of Human Rights, April 14, 1980 ("women only" health spa with inadequate facilities 
to serve both sexes granted an exemption from the state law) (on file with the Journal of Law 
Reform). 
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siveness of this stereotype against the social policies the practice pro-
motes, allowing only important social policies87 to outweigh the burden-
some effects of a stereotype. Notwithstanding those who feel that 
gender-based cultural differences are never rationally based, 88 some social 
policies clearly legitimize certain gender-based distinctions. Privacy in-
terests, for example, justify separate rest rooms and hospital rooms 
for men and women; 89 such important interests outweigh any of the 
stereotypes conceivably underlying the practice. 
The justification that "ladies' nights" are widely accepted and en-
courage attendance thus fails to support this practice under the pro-
posed reasonableness test. The widespread acceptance of "ladies' nights" 
does not excuse perpetuating the demeaning stereotype of women as 
improvident and helpless. 90 Moreover, encouraging the attendance of 
only one sex serves no important social policy. Conversely, a court 
might well be persuaded that concerns about exposure, violence, and 
privacy warrant separation of the sexes in rest rooms, hospital rooms, 
and correctional facilities. 91 
For a limited category of practices, however, the issue of 
reasonableness is difficult to resolve. Although privacy interests may 
justify separate rest rooms and prohibit "men only bars, " 92 in other 
contexts the privacy justification is not clearly determinative. For ex-
ample, public accommodations sometimes reserve separate time slots 
for male and female patrons, with some hours open to both sexes. 93 
Although only minimally burdensome, 94 perhaps this separate-but-equal 
practice fails the reasonableness test because separation may promote 
the offensive prejudice that one sex is bothersome to the other. At 
the same time, no important social policies outweigh the potentially 
87. The definition of "important" social policies is not addressed in this Note. Such a deter-
mination will depend on a multitude of factors not readily examinable in the present analysis. 
88. See supra note 83. 
89. But see Wasserstrom, supra note 5, at 594 (arguing that the purpose behind segregated 
rest rooms and hospital rooms is not privacy but the preservations of the mystery concerning 
the genitalia which maintains the "primacy of heterosexual attraction central to [the] ... patriarchal 
system of power relationships we have today."). 
90. See supra note 6. 
91. But see supra note 89. 
92. The privacy concerns of the patron of an all-male bar differ markedly from those of 
the hospital patient. While the hospital patient is compelled to remain in the hospital, the bar 
patron may seek respite in alternative settings. Moreover, worries about bodily exposure are 
not relevant to the bar patron's privacy concerns. Consequently, because all-male bars serve 
no important public policy, and may promote the demeaning stereotype of women as 
"homemakers" incapable of handling both themselves and their liquor in a bar, the proposed 
reasonableness standard is not met. 
93. This practice is fairly common in establishments such as skating rinks. 
94. Unlike operating an all-male bar, reserving different hours for men and women does 
not exclude a particular sex from attending the accommodation. But such a practice may be 
de facto exclusionary. If, for example, the accommodation sponsored separate hours for women 
during inconvenient times of the day, it would effectively deter their attendance. 
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offensive impressions it fosters. 95 Another setting where the 
reasonableness test is not clearly determinative is that of ''women only'' 
health spas. Like segregated time slots, such segregated spas may depict 
one sex as a nuisance to the other. On the other hand, this segregation 
is founded upon the same privacy reasons underlying separate rest 
rooms. 96 Notwithstanding this potential justification, "women only" 
health spas fail the second part of this Note's preferentiality test, the 
evenhandedness requirement. 
B. Evenhandedness 
A reasonable gender-based practice may nevertheless be pref eren-
tial. "Evenhandedness" requires that places of public accommodation 
provide equal benefits to members of both sexes. 97 Even where segrega-
tion is reasonable, accommodations must ·furnish equivalent facilities 
and privileges. Thus, if a gender-based practice dictates "two entirely 
different standards," 98 rather than relatively similar standards, it fails 
the evenhandedness requirement and violates the equal treatment 
principle. 
In most cases, this issue of equality of standards is easily resolved. 
A hospital, for example, may not reserve all the best rooms for members 
of one sex. Similarly, assuming that the occasional segregation of 
customers at particular hours is not unreasonable, 99 one sex cannot 
be granted this privilege and the other denied it. Such unequal treat-
ment fails the evenhandedness requirement. By the same token, 
establishments catering solely to members of one sex, such as ''men 
only" bars or "women only" health spas, fail to survive scrutiny. Even 
if justified on privacy grounds, 100 this exclusiveness is impermissible 
because members of only one sex are restricted. The failure to provide 
similar facilities for both sexes is a breach of the accommodation's 
obligation of equal treatment. 101 
95. The privacy interest secured by this practice more closely approximates that of the all-
male bar than the hospital room. See supra note 92. 
96. As used in this Note, the term "segregated spas" refers to exercise spas accommodating 
only one sex. Spas which accommodate both sexes yet have certain segregated facilities (e.g. 
saunas) may more closely resemble segregated rest rooms. 
97. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text. Cf. Smith v. Suburban Restaurants, Inc., 
373 N.E.2d 215 (Mass. 1978) (holding that a place of public accommodation is obligated to 
treat each member of the public equally in the absence of good cause). 
98. Cf. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Chicago, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th 
Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII prohibits "two entirely separate dress codes" for men and women). 
99. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
100. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
101. A health spa established prior to the passage of a state's public accommodation statute 
might be exempt from the law if it were incapable of providing facilities for both men and women. 
See supra note 86. An alternative to exemption, however, is alternating days for men and women. 
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In certain cases, determinations of evenhandedness are not so sim-
ple. The evenhandedness of standards promulgated under practices such 
as dress codes, for example, depends greatly on geographic and social 
customs. 102 Where evenhandedness depends upon such factors, a jury 
is especially suited to resolve the issue. 103 Once a trial court determines 
that a gender-based practice is not unreasonable, the jury should then 
be allowed to decide whether the separate standards apply evenhandedly. 
CONCLUSION 
State public accommodations statutes embody a legislative goal of 
equal treatment for all persons. Courts interpreting these statutes have 
failed, however, to recognize the principle of equal treatment underly-
ing such legislation; the result has often been either overly restrictive 
or overbroad application of these statutes. This Note proposes a 
pref erentiality test for gender-based distinctions which will advance the 
fundamental "equal treatment" objective of public accommodations 
legislation without creating a gender-blind society. Application of this 
test will ensure equal treatment for both men and women while preserv-
ing those gender-based distinctions which are neither demeaning nor 
102. See Hales v. Ojai Valley Inn and Country Club, 73 Cal. App. 3d 25, 140 Cal. Rptr. 
555, 558 (1979) (remanding with order that the trial court determine "arbitrariness" of dress 
codes on the basis of "community standards"). 
"Hair codes" also reflect social convention and prevailing notions of "fashion." They are 
sometimes used to exclude long-haired males. See, e.g., Braun v. Swiston, 72 Misc. 2d 661, 
340 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1972) (exclusion of long-haired males held to violate state antidiscrimination law). 
Hair codes are more difficult than dress codes to analyze. A distinction between long-haired 
males and long-haired females can conceivably apply in an evenhanded manner because "fashion" 
dictates that men be held to stricter grooming requirements than women. This argument, however, 
overlooks the issue of whether this distinction is "reasonable." Unlike dress codes, a humiliating 
stereotype underlies a hair code which distinguishes long-haired males from long-haired females. 
Long-haired males are frequently considered rebellious or otherwise objectionable. See, e.g., Ham 
v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 530 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring and dissenting). Nor does 
the exclusion of long-haired males serve an important social policy. Although the length of an 
employee's hair may be regulated under Title VII on the grounds that a salaried representative 
is expected to present a certain image, see, e.g., Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481 F.2d 
ll 15, ll24-25 (D.C. Cir. 1973), no such considerations apply with respect to public accommoda-
tions statutes. Indeed, this policy may so burden the patron that it contravenes certain constitu-
tional policies. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-86 (1st Cir. 1970). 
103. Judge Pell's dissent in Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 
(7th Cir. 1979), underscores this point. The judge disagreed with the majority as to whether 
men and women were subject to relatively equal standards, stating, "[i)n sum, customary attire 
for the men employees of Talman seems to me to confine these employees in a uniform to the 
same extent as the Talman dress code does for women .... " Id. at 1034. 
Fashion is an area in which the jury is likely to have as much expertise as the court. Moreover, 
community standards will have some bearing on the question of fashions and a jury is best able 
to ascertain these community standards. The evenhandedness of fashion-oriented standards, 
therefore, is a question particularly suited for the jury. 
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burdensome, thereby permitting each gender to retain its distinctive 
character. 
-Alan J. Hoff 
